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Abstract 
 
The starting point of this paper is to consider that there is no general answer to the question of 
the equity of urban road pricing. We therefore simulate and compare the distributional effects 
on commuters of nine toll scenarios for Paris, assuming that utility is nonlinear in income. We 
show that the distributional pattern across income groups depends crucially on the level of 
traffic reduction induced by tolling. Stringent tolls are more favourable to low-income 
motorists. Equity effects also vary with toll design. Compared to a reference scenario which 
uniformly charges all motorists driving within Paris, an inbound cordon toll is detrimental to 
low-incomes. Conversely, granting a rebate to low CO2 emission cars slightly improves their 
situation while an exemption for Paris residents is neutral. Surprisingly, it matters little for 
social equity whether toll revenues are allocated to all commuters or solely to public transport 
users. 
 
Keywords: Road pricing, Distributional effects, Income effects, Equity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The success of the London congestion charging scheme, set up in February 2003, has modified 
the views of many European policymakers on road pricing. Most of them now consider that it 
is a credible instrument to tackle urban congestion, although the legal framework in some EU 
countries still prohibits its implementation (e.g., France). However, many stakeholders criticise 
urban tolls on equity grounds, arguing that it disproportionately burdens low-income travellers. 
This argument has some theoretical foundations as high-income travellers have generally 
higher values of travel time than low-income ones. Accordingly, they tend to value more the 
reduced travel times induced by the implementation of tolls. Furthermore, they value less the 
financial loss of the toll as the marginal utility of income is decreasing. 
Arguments leading to opposite conclusions are also available. For instance, motorists 
usually have higher incomes than the other travellers.1 Most importantly, the overall 
distributional impacts of road pricing ultimately depend on the allocation of the toll revenues. 
To sum up, the answer to the question of urban tolls’ equity is indeterminate in general. It 
depends on the scheme considered, on the use of the toll revenues, and on the urban context in 
which tolling is introduced. Accordingly, the relevant approach consists in comparing the 
distributional effects of different toll scenarios. 
This paper analyzes nine scenarios for Paris using disaggregated data from the Global 
Transport Survey carried out in 2001-2002 (Enquête Globale Transport Ile-de-France 2001-
2002). The reference scenario is a toll requiring vehicles driven within Paris to pay a uniform 
fee per trip which induces a 20% traffic reduction. Then, we consider several variants: different 
levels of traffic reduction (10%, 30% and 50%); a cordon toll which only applies to vehicles 
                                                 
1 For instance, the income of motorists circulating in Paris is 30% higher than the income of individuals using PT 
(source: EGT 2001-2002). 
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entering Paris, a toll in which residents are partially exempted, a toll with discounts for low 
CO2 emitting cars. We also study two scenarios of revenue recycling. 
We restrict the analysis to commuters and to the direct effects of road pricing: the 
monetary cost of the toll and the changes in travel time. We derive three indicators reflecting 
the distributional properties of the scenarios. First, we measure the mean commuters’ 
compensating variation due to the introduction of the toll. In this way, we try to work out the 
degree of political acceptability of the different scenarios. Second, we characterize the 
relationship between individual compensating variations, expressed in euros per trip, and 
income. The aim is to identify the magnitude of the potential redistribution between income 
groups. Third, we study the relationship between the individual compensating variations, 
expressed as a percentage of income, and income. The last indicator is usually referred to as 
regressiveness in public economics. 
The empirical literature dealing with the distributional effects of road pricing is 
developing very quickly. Eliasson and Mattsson (2006) examine the equity effects of a cordon 
toll in Stockholm.2 Teubel (2000) does the same in Dresden, while Santos and Rojey (2004) 
assess the potential distributional impacts of a cordon toll in three English towns (Cambridge, 
Northampton and Bedford). Franklin (2006) analyses the equity effects of a toll bridge in the 
State of Washington, USA. Raux and Souche (2004) examine the distributional effects of an 
urban toll motorway in Lyon. These five studies analyse a particular form of urban pricing: a 
bridge toll in Franklin (2006), a link toll on a ring road in Raux and Souche (2004), and a 
simple inbound cordon toll in the other studies. The results that they give are only valid for the 
studied scenarios. 
In contrast with these papers, we compare nine scenarios. We believe that a 
comparative approach is better-suited to derive policy implications. By considering different 
                                                 
2 Their scenario is a modified version of the scheme actually implemented in Stockholm in 2006. Note that they 
analyze different allocations of toll revenues. 
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variants, we are able to investigate the drivers of the distributional impacts. In this regards, our 
paper is closer to Safirova et al. (2003), or to Maruyama and Sumalee (2007) who examine 
different forms of road pricing in Washington, DC. and in Utsunomiya, Japan, respectively. 
However, their results are not easily transferable to European cities as the geography of urban 
areas, the spatial distribution of income and the relative importance of public transport (PT 
hereafter) are completely different. In particular, Safirova et al.’s results depend crucially on 
the pre-existence of restricted high-occupancy vehicles (HOV) lanes on major freeways in the 
DC area. Such HOV lanes hardly ever exist in European cities. 
From a methodological point of view, we use a random utility model that is nonlinear in 
income. This leads us to calculate exact compensating variations for each commuter using the 
formula recently derived by Dagsvik and Karlström (2005). This is of most interest since, as 
argued by Jara-Díaz and Videla (1989), traditional mode choice models which assume a 
constant marginal utility of income tend to under-estimate regressiveness. To the best of our 
knowledge, Franklin (2006) is the only other work which implements this new method to the 
equity of urban tolls. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the mode choice model 
which will provide the basis for the econometric estimations. The second section deals with 
econometric aspects and the third section presents the results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. An income-sensitive mode choice model 
 
In this section, we develop a random-utility model describing the mode choice of individuals 
making trips which is not linear in income and describe how we calculate individual 
compensating variations induced by tolling.  
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Consider a population of individuals who are forced to make a trip, for example to go to 
work or to University. This assumption will lead us to make our estimations on a sample of 
individuals doing home-to-work trips. An individual faces two alternatives j = A, B. A describes 
the option “take the car” and B the option “use PT”. The generalised costs associated with the 
two alternatives are 
 
ε
ε
Γ = Ω +
Γ = Ω +
A A A
B B B
 (1) 
where ε A  and ε B  are random variables whose realization is only known to the individual. In 
order to address income effects, we consider a model which is not linear in income. More 
specifically, assuming budget exhaustion, we write 
 
α α αβ γ φ
β γ φ ϕ
Ω = + − + +
Ω = + − + +
A A A
B B B
T y C
T y C
A
B
X Y
X Y
ϕ
 (2) 
with: 
α: a superscript equal to 1 if a toll is introduced, 0 otherwise. 
Tj: the duration of the trip with alternative j. 
Cj: the monetary cost of alternative j. 
y: the individual’s income. 
X: a vector of characteristics of the individual. 
Yj: a vector of characteristics of the alternative j. 
, , ,β γ φ ϕ : the parameters or the vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
 
Note that the duration of the trip by car, TA, and the cost CA depend on α as the toll 
reduces congestion and increases the monetary cost of this alternative. But we assume that the 
duration of the trip by PT, TB, is not affected by the introduction of the toll. This assumption is B
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clearly restrictive for trips made by bus that also benefit from the congestion reduction. These 
trips represent solely 9% of the trips made by PT in our sample. 
Interestingly, the marginal utility of income is not constant under specification (2) as it 
writes 
 
j
j
Cyy −−=∂
Ω∂−
2
γ , 
 
Assuming that γ is negative – meaning that the generalised cost of alternative j increases with 
the monetary cost of j – the marginal utility of income decreases with income. Similarly, the 
unit value of time is 
 2j jj j
j j
T
y C
C
∂ ∂ βλ ∂ ∂ γ
Ω≡ = −Ω − . (3) 
If one realistically assumes that γ < 0 and β > 0, the value of time increases with income. 
Before proceeding, let us discuss further assumptions underlying (2). To begin with, (2) 
implies that a motorist facing a toll has only two options: to continue to use a car or to switch to 
PT. Hence, we forego at least three other possibilities: (i) to refrain from doing the trip, (ii) to 
modify the departure time and (iii) to change the route to avoid tolling. To dismiss the first 
option does not raise particular difficulties because we estimate the mode choice of individuals 
making home-to-work trips. The second alternative is not very relevant in our case for two 
reasons. First, we concentrate on home-to-work trips which are not very flexible. Second, this 
option would be interesting if modifying the departure time permitted to avoid or to reduce the 
toll payment. But we will not study any scenarios involving a time-varying toll. To neglect the 
third option is probably more problematic. Studying this option would require a sophisticated 
traffic model. However, it is only relevant for the trips through Paris; those trips represent a 
mere 15% of the trips in our sample. 
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Turning next to the calculations of individual surpluses, let U denote the individual’s 
utility. As the individual opts for the least-costly alternative, it is given by:  
 ( ){ }( ) max ,α α≡ −Γ −ΓA BU  (4) 
Consider now a change from the initial state without toll ( 0α = ) to the new state with a toll 
( 1α = ). The individual’s compensating variation is the amount of money cv such that 
( 0)U α = = { }1 1max ,A A A B BT y cv C T y cv Cβ γ φ ϕ ε β γ φ ϕ ε⎡ ⎤ B⎡ ⎤− + − − + + + − + − − + + +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦A BX Y X Y
 (5) 
This expression simply says that cv is the amount of money that, when subtracted from income 
in the new state, equates maximum utility in the new state with maximum utility in the initial 
state. In this context, compensating variations also vary as a function of income, as one would 
expect. 
The problem is that U is observed by the individual but not by the researcher who can 
only calculate E[cv]. Let us now adopt the researcher’s perspective. We consider a traditional 
logit model in which the probability that individual prefers the car is 
 ( ) ( )P Pr Prα αε ε ε ε= Ω + < Ω + = − < Ω −ΩA A A B B A B B A  
where ε ε−A B  follows a logistic distribution while the functional form of PA is given by 
 P ( , )
α
α
α
−Ω
−Ω −ΩΩ Ω = +
A
A B
A A B
e
e e
 (6) 
If jαΩ  was linear in income, one would simply use the well-known log sum formula to 
calculate E[cv]. However, the presence of income effects makes the calculation much more 
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complex. Fortunately, Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) have recently provided an exact formula 
for the expected compensating variation.3 It writes: 
 [ ] ( ) ( )jj j j j
j
E cv y P z dP z
μ
μ
μ μ⎧ ⎫⎪= − − ⋅⎨⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ ∫ ⎪⎬
A
 (7) 
where Pj(z) is the choice probability: 
 
0( ( ), ( )) if
( )
( ( ), ( )) if
A A B
j
B A B
P y g z j
P z
P g z y j B
⎧ Ω =⎪= ⎨ Ω =⎪⎩
 
and 
μj is implicitly defined by 0 0 0 1 1 1( , , ) ( , , )j j j j j j jy T C T CμΩ = Ω  
{ }min ,A Bμ μ μ=  
0 1( ) max[ ( ), ( )]j j jg z y= Ω Ω z  
 
3. Simulation model and data description 
 
Having described how we model mode choice and calculate compensating variations (cv), we 
now describe how we simulate the different toll scenarios.  
3.1. Simulation procedures 
 
We proceed in five stages. 
• We estimate econometrically the parameters , , , andβ γ φ ϕ  of equation (2) using data 
from the 2001-2002 Global Transport Survey. 
                                                 
3 Although an exact formula was not previously available, less satisfactory approximations of E[cv] had been 
suggested in the literature. For instance, McFadden (1999) has developed a Monte Carlo simulator for computing 
cv in random utility models which converges to the true distribution of cv. 
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• We estimate a speed-flow function that links the traffic level to speed in order to 
calculate the car travel time 1AT  once a toll is introduced. 
• Using an iterative process, we use the estimated parameters ˆ ˆˆ, , , and ˆβ γ φ ϕ  and the 
estimated travel time  to predict the mode choice of motorists with and without the 
toll. 
1
AˆT
• We use the formula (7) to calculate the individual compensating variations. 
3.2. Data description 
 
We use disaggregated data from the 2001-2002 Global Transport Survey (Enquête Globale 
Transport Ile-de-France 2001-2002). This survey has been carried out regularly for 25 years. It 
allows us to follow and analyse trip patterns in Ile-de-France. Ile-de-France is a vast area of 
12,072 sq km and 10.9 millions inhabitants. The city of Paris is only a small part of that area 
with a surface of 105 sq km and 2.1 millions inhabitants. 
The sample surveyed is representative of the Ile-de-France population with respect to 
social and geographical characteristics. 10,500 households were surveyed between October 
2001 and April 2002. Each member of the household, older than 6, is interviewed about all the 
trips she/he made the day before the survey. For each trip, a broad variety of data is available, 
for example: time of departure and arrival, trip purpose, origin, destination and mode(s) used. 
General household characteristics are also described (e.g., size, location, income) as well as 
characteristics of each member (e.g., age, sex, profession). 
As stated above, our estimations are limited to home-to-work trips. Those trips 
represent about one third of car and PT trips in Paris intra muros. Moreover, we only consider 
travellers possessing a driving licence and belonging to a household owning at least one car. 
We also focus only on trips made by private car or PT. Non-motorised two-wheel or pedestrian 
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trips are therefore excluded considering that urban tolls pertain to an alternative “car versus 
PT”. We also exclude taxi and motorised two-wheel trips as well as trips made by car as a 
passenger. Concerning home-to-work trips, the latter options are very rarely chosen (3.6% on 
the trips considered). In the end, our estimations are carried out using a sample of 1032 trips. 
Finally, we use control variables that are commonly used (see for example Teubel, 
2000):  
FEMALE = 1 if the individual is a woman, 0 otherwise;  
FREE_PARK = 1 if the individual gets a car park for free at her place of work, 0 otherwise; 
TWO_CARS =1 if the household owns two cars or more, 0 otherwise; 
TWO_KIDS = 1 if the household has two children or more, 0 otherwise. 
Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics of our sample and the variables used for 
the estimation. For instance, it can be seen that motorists represent around 29% of the sample, 
that on average car trips last 3.79 minutes less than trips by PT and that woman are in a 
minority (45%). 
 
3.3. Estimation of mode choice and unit values of time 
Table 2 presents the results of the mode choice estimation. Coefficients of the model are clearly 
significant and present signs that are not absurd. For instance, the number of cars in the 
household and the availability of a car park for free clearly increase the propensity to travel by 
car.  
Recall that our specification allows us to define thoroughly the relationship between 
income and unit value of time. Table 3 presents these values by quintile of income. Income 
group 1 includes the 20% of individuals having the lowest income; quintiles 1 and 2 include the 
40% of individuals having the lowest income, etc. These figures show a strong and positive 
relationship between income and value of time.  
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3.4. Time savings 
Time savings are calculated using a speed-flow function estimated econometrically on a sample 
that describes traffic levels and speeds for 19 time slots. For each slot, we calculate the total 
traffic by car and the average speed of car trips in Paris. The regression of the logarithm of 
traffic on the average speed presents a R2 of 0.58 and gives the following relationship:  
SPEED =  -69.0 × ln(TRAFFIC) + 877.4 
where SPEED is the average speed of car trips in meters per minute in a given slot and 
TRAFFIC is the total number of trips per slot4. 
We use this equation to calculate times savings by making two simplifying 
assumptions: (i) motorists travelling partially in the charging zone - those whose origin or 
destination is outside the zone - cover a distance equal to the average of distances covered by 
motorists that travel exclusively in the charging zone (namely 3,171 meters for Paris intra 
muros); (ii) the traffic reduction rate induced by tolling equals the traffic reduction rate 
predicted for motorists making home-to-work trips. This amounts to assuming that all the 
motorists generally behave like motorists making home-to-work trips. The first hypothesis is 
necessary as the Global Transport Survey does not describe the length of the part of the trip 
made in Paris. The second is necessary because we only estimate mode choices for commuters. 
Additional details are given in the appendix. The appendix also includes a table giving average 
travel time reductions for all the scenarios. 
 
                                                 
4 The level of traffic taken into account is the total traffic observed in the Global Transport Survey, i.e., the traffic 
due to individual trips. It excludes deliveries and freight. 
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3.5. Scenarios considered 
Table 4 describes the 9 scenarios. As a benchmark, we use the so-called Zone scenario. It is a 
toll which charges uniformly for internal trips within Paris, trips in Paris with an origin or a 
destination in the suburbs and through trips with both an origin and a destination outside Paris5. 
It is calibrated to lead to a 20% reduction of the whole traffic within the zone (inbound, 
outbound or internal). Furthermore, we assume no distribution of toll revenues to commuters. 
Then, we consider different variations of this reference scenario: 
• Other levels of traffic reduction (10%, 30%, 50%). 
• The introduction of exemptions: the Inbound Cordon scenario in which the toll only 
applies to vehicles entering Paris; the Residents scenario where people living within the 
charging zone (i.e., Paris residents) only pay 10% of the toll level as in London; the 
Green scenario where drivers of cars emitting less than 180 gCO2 per km get a 50% 
rebate. 
We also consider two variants of the Zone scenario where toll revenues are redistributed to 
commuters. In a first scenario (PT funding), revenues are used to cut PT fares. In a second 
scenario (Uniform Redistribution), each commuter receives a uniform lump sum payment.6  
In Table 4, we see that the toll unsurprisingly increases with the level of traffic reduction. 
It also rises when some motorists are partially or totally exempted (Inbound Cordon, Residents 
or Green) while it is reduced when the toll revenues are used to cut PT fares as shifting to PT 
becomes less costly. Interestingly, the toll fee increases slightly when the toll revenues are 
evenly redistributed to all commuters (Uniform Redistribution). This is a simple income effect: 
redistribution makes individuals (slightly) richer. Hence, they value less an increase of the car 
travel costs, thereby requiring a higher toll to achieve the same level of traffic reduction. 
                                                 
5 Note that our benchmark scenario differs from a zone toll of the London type. In London, one payment allows 
the vehicle to be used for as many journeys as the driver wishes in the charging zone. In our scenario, a fee is 
imposed on each single trip in the charging zone. 
6 In both scenarios, redistribution also concerns captive PT users – defined as PT users without a driver’s license 
or access to a car. These commuters represent around 43% of total PT users making home-to-work trips in Paris. 
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 4. Results and discussion 
 
We present our results in two steps. First, we study the average individual welfare changes 
induced by the different scenarios. In doing this, we seek to compare the overall degree of 
political acceptability of different tolls. Then, we assess the distributional effects across 
different income groups for each scenario.  
4.1. Average compensating variations 
Table 5 describes the average compensating variations induced by the different scenarios as 
well as the percentage of winners in each scenario. We focus on the scenarios involving a 20% 
traffic reduction as the impact on average cv of different reduction rates is easily predictable. 
The most important result is that, whatever the scenario, the average compensating 
variation of motorists is significantly negative. In other words, motorists taken as a whole tend 
to lose when a toll is introduced. The percentage of winners is even zero for the Zone scenario 
which does not include exemptions. 
This is not surprising given the values of travel time presented in Table 3. At most, they 
reach 11.4 euros per hour. This implies that, for instance, a toll of 2 euros per day would need 
to reduce per day travel times by 11 minutes just to compensate for the toll. This time saving is 
unlikely in a charging zone of 105 sq km where the duration of trips is necessarily limited (22 
minutes on average for car trips inside Paris). 
If average cvs are all negative, the magnitude of the loss varies across scenarios. For 
instance, Residents induces lower losses than Zone (€0.81 versus €1.01). This is so because the 
exemption yields two opposite effects. On the one hand, residents pay less (€0.255 instead of 
€2.55). On the other hand, this partial exemption requires increasing the toll to keep the same 
traffic reduction level, thereby rising individual losses for the rest of the population (€2.55 for 
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Residents instead of €1.70 for Zone). Our simulations show that the former dominates the 
latter, probably because the proportion of residents among the motorists who stay on the road 
once the toll is introduced under the Zone scenario is quite high (around 50%). 
Conversely, the average losses induced by Inbound Cordon and Green are similar to the 
benchmark (€1.03 and €1.02 versus €1.01 for Zone) suggesting that the two effects compensate 
each other. 
Turning next to the scenarios PT funding and Uniform Redistribution, the recycling of 
revenues towards commuters obviously decreases losses. The two recycling scenarios produce 
similar results in terms of average loss (€0.68). To begin with, tolling is clearly politically risky 
as the proportion of gainers is low in most cases. Then, if reducing potential political 
opposition of motorists is crucial, redistributing revenues to commuters is obviously adequate.  
 
4.2. Distributional effects across income groups 
Having compared the average cv induced by the different scenarios, we now consider equity 
issues by examining how the cv varies across income groups. 
 
Traffic reduction 
Table 6 focuses on the Zone scenario and considers the influence of different levels of traffic 
reduction on equity. We express cvs in euros per trip and in proportion of income. 
Let us first discuss the value of cvs expressed in euros per trip. Table 6 immediately shows that 
low-income motorists loose more than richer motorists when the reduction rate is low (10% or 
20%). But the reverse is true for higher reduction rates.  
In order to explain this result, recall first that high income motorists – who are also 
individuals with high value of time – tend to place more value on congestion reduction and are 
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less affected by the toll’s financial burden (because the marginal utility of income is 
decreasing). This is why, in theory, they would tend to lose less than low-income motorists 
when they keep using their car ex post. This scenario only applies to the motorists who 
continue to use their cars once the toll is introduced.  
What about the income profile and cv of those who switch to PT? Table 7 compares 
their cv and income with those of the ex post motorists' group under the Zone scenario. We can 
see that they lose much less than the other group and that they have lower income. 
To sum up, we have two opposite effects. On the one hand, the richest individuals lose 
less than the poorest within the group of motorists who continue to use their car. On the other 
hand motorists who shift to PT are poorer than the motorists staying on the road, and lose less. 
According to Table 6, the first effect dominates the second when motorists continuing to use 
their cars are numerous – that is, when tolling reduce the traffic by 10, 20% - while the reverse 
is true for higher levels of traffic reduction (50%). Under the 30% reduction scenario both 
effects compensate each other so that cvs do not change across income groups.  
Finally, when considering cv in percentage of income, Table 6 shows that low-income 
individuals lose more than richer individuals whatever the scenario. Therefore, all scenarios are 
regressive. 
 
Exemptions 
We now investigate the impact of different exemptions. Table 8 shows the difference between 
the average cv under Inbound Cordon, Residents, and Green and the average cv under Zone. 
Figures are given for the income group 1 which gathers the 20% of individuals with the lowest 
income. We focus on cv in €/trip as there is no reason why patterns would significantly change 
with cv expressed in proportion to income. 
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The ranking between the different scenarios is not ambiguous. The scenario Inbound 
Cordon is the worst option for low-income individuals. The scenario Residents is similar to 
Zone while Green makes low-income motorists slightly better off. In order to understand why 
this is, Table 8 displays the percentage of motorists who enjoy a rebate or an exemption in 
income group 1 as compared to the whole population. Under Cordon, the share of poor 
motorists travelling within Paris (7%) is half that of the whole population (15%). On the other 
hand, about 36% of motorists drive low CO2 emitting cars in income group 1 – a proportion 
slightly higher than in the whole population, while Residents is an intermediate case. This is 
consistent with the ranking given by Table 8. 
We complete the analysis of the influence of exemptions by examining how the level of 
losses varies with the level of income. Figure 1 and 2 shows cv as a function of income for the 
motorists and the commuters respectively. Using this indicator, Green is again the best scenario 
for the poorest. Then, Zone is in intermediate position while Residents and Inbound Cordon are 
the less equitable options. 
Note also that, except for Residents, the welfare losses are an increasing function of 
income for the whole population of commuters while it is generally the opposite within the 
motorists' group. The explanation is straightforward. Low-income individuals tend to use PT 
much more than high-income individuals: 70% of those in quintile 1 use PT, but only 37% of 
those in quintile 5. 
 
Recycling of toll revenues 
Until now, we have discussed scenarios in which revenues are not redistributed to commuters, 
meaning that recycling has no impacts on the distributional profile. Here, we consider the 
scenario where revenues are used to cut PT fares (PT Funding) and the scenario in which 
revenues are evenly redistributed to all commuters (Uniform Redistribution). 
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 Table 9 gathers the main figures. It shows that the two scenarios have the same 
distributional profile. This might be surprising as low-income commuters opt more frequently 
for the PT mode. Given this, one would expect smaller losses for them under the PT funding 
scenario which allocates all the revenues to PT. But this is not the end of the story. Reducing 
the cost of PT increases the incentives for motorists to withdraw their car. Therefore, the toll 
rate necessary for a 20% traffic reduction is smaller than without redistribution to PT.7 Hence, 
motorists also gain, albeit indirectly, when the revenues are allocated to PT. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have developed an econometric model to simulate the distributional effects of various 
urban road pricing scenarios in Paris. The methodology is based on a mode choice model that 
is nonlinear in income. This is particularly suitable for assessing distributional effects as it 
relaxes the assumption of constant marginal utility of income made in traditional models. 
Nevertheless, two methodological limits should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
First, we only deal with home-to-work trips. Second, we rely on a basic traffic model – a 
simple speed-flow relationship - to calculate the time reductions induced by tolling.  
 That being said, the analysis brings out four types of results. First, we show that 
motorists endure average welfare losses ranging from €0.7 to €1.0 per trip when a toll that 
induces a 20% traffic reduction is implemented. In other words, motorists taken as a whole 
tend to lose when a toll is introduced. This result is not surprising when one considers their 
values of travel time. They reach €11.4 per hour at the most, which would require a travel time 
reduction of around 11 minutes to outweigh a €2 toll, for example. For scenarios 
geographically limited to Paris, such large time savings are almost always impossible. 
                                                 
7 According to our simulations, the toll is €1.40 under PT funding as compared to €1.70 under Zone. 
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 Although all the scenarios imply welfare losses on average for motorists, those losses 
do not have the same magnitude. They are smaller when residents are partially exempted. Thus, 
the political acceptability of tolling could be improved with this exemption. On the other hand, 
an inbound cordon toll exempting those who make car trips within Paris generates the highest 
average loss. 
 Concerning the distributional effects of tolls across different income groups, 
conclusions primarily depend on whether the losses induced by tolling are measured in 
absolute terms, i.e., in euros per trip, or in relative terms, i.e., as a percentage of income. In 
relative terms, tolls are always more detrimental to low-income individuals, meaning that 
tolling is regressive. 
 In absolute terms, results are much less clear-cut. In fact, the distributional pattern 
depends crucially on the level of traffic reduction. When it is low (10% or 20%), the poorest 
motorists lose more than the richest ones. But the reverse is true for higher reduction rates. The 
reason for this is that the motorists who switch to PT lose less and are poorer on average than 
the other motorists. As the size of this subpopulation increases with the level of traffic 
reduction, stringent tolls tend to be more favourable to low-income individuals. 
Turning next to the impacts of various exemptions, an interesting result is that granting 
a rebate to low CO2 emission cars slightly improves the situation of low-income individuals 
relative to high-income individuals while the inbound cordon scenario has opposite effects. 
This is because motorists entering Paris have lower incomes. The distributional pattern of the 
scenario in which Paris residents only pay 10% of the toll is contrasted. Clearly, the poorest 
individuals lose more than the richest ones, because residents are far richer than suburban 
individuals. But they endure the same losses as under the reference scenario without 
exemption. 
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 When taking into account the allocation of toll revenues, we obtain the somewhat 
surprising result that there is no significant difference between a scenario which allocates 
receipts to PT users and a scenario which evenly distributes receipts to all commuters. One 
would expect PT funding to be more favourable to low-income individuals as motorists are 
significantly richer than PT users. However, allocating money to PT increases the incentives 
for motorists to withdraw their car. Therefore, for a given traffic reduction rate, the level of the 
toll is lower, implying indirect gains for motorists. 
 In our view, the major policy lesson of this analysis is that the design of the road pricing 
scheme and the level of traffic reduction strongly influence equity patterns. Note that the same 
is probably true for social efficiency. But this is out of the scope of the present paper. 
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Appendix 
For a given individual trip, we calculate the new car travel time 1AT  after the introduction of the 
toll with the formula: 
 
0
0
1
1
0
0
0 1
if the trip is exclusively made inside Paris
3,171 1 , otherwise
A
A
A
A
SPEEDT
SPEED
T
SPEEDT
v SPEED
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪= ⎨ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎪ + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎩
 
with: 
• : the average car speed before the introduction of the toll in the slot during 
which the individual trip is made 
0SPEED
• : the average car speed after the introduction of the toll in the slot during 
which the trip is made. It is estimated using the speed-flow relationship. 
1SPEED
• 0AT : the travel time before the toll. 
• 0Av : the individual speed before the toll 
• 3,171 m is the average distance covered by motorists that travel exclusively in the 
charging zone. 
The major assumption underlying the formulas for calculating 1AT  is that the individual speed 
increase rate is equal to the increase of the average speed in the time slot. That is, 
. 0 1 0/ /A Av v SPEED SPEED= 1
Under this assumption, deriving 1AT  for the trips made inside Paris is straightforward. It is less 
obvious for the other trips. Let d denote the total trip distance and dP the distance made in 
Paris. As previously stated, we assume that dP =3,171 m. Then, we have 
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 1 0
( )
1
P P
A
A A
d d dT
v v
−= +  (A.1) 
Rearranging  and substituting in (A.1) yields the formula. 0 1 0/ /A Av v SPEED SPEED= 1
Sensitivity analysis shows that our results are pretty robust to changes in distances covered in 
the charging zone. For instance, the assumption that motorists travelling partially in the 
charging zone - those whose origin or destination is outside the zone - cover a distance equal to 
the average of distances covered by motorists that travel exclusively in the charging zone 
(3,171 meters) is robust. Doubling this distance (6,342 meters) – which means doubling the 
distance for which motorists enjoy travel time savings – does not modify the final distributional 
patterns significantly. 
Finally, Table A1 gives the average travel time reduction and the average speed variation for 
the different toll scenarios. The table only considers motorists driving before and after the toll 
is introduced. 
 
Table A1: Travel time reduction and speed increase for the nine scenarios 
 
Scenario Avg. initial 
travel time  
Avg. travel time 
reduction induced by 
tolling 
Avg. 
initial 
speed  
Avg. speed increase 
induced by tolling 
 minutes minutes % km/h km/h % 
Zone 20% 36.2 -1.9 -5% 16.3 1.0 6% 
       
Zone 10% 37.3 -0.9 -2% 16.1 0.4 3% 
Zone 30% 35.6 -2.9 -8% 16.4 1.5 9% 
Zone 50% 33.3 -4.8 -14% 16.1 3.6 23% 
       
Inbound Cordon 35.2 -1.9 -6% 15.8 1.0 6% 
Residents 35.6 -2.0 -6% 15.6 1.0 6% 
Green 36.6 -1.9 -5% 16.3 1.0 6% 
PT funding 36.2 -1.9 -5% 16.3 1.0 6% 
Uniform 
redistribution 
36.2 -1.9 -5% 16.3 1.0 6% 
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Figure 1: Average cv of motorists (€/trip) by income group under Zone, Inbound Cordon, 
Residents and Green as compared to income group 1 (Income group 1 = Base 0) 
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Figure 2: Average cv of commuters (€/trip) by income group under Zone, Inbound 
Cordon, Residents and Green as compared to income group 1 (Income group 1 = Base 0) 
 
Zone
Cordon
Residents
Green
-0,40
-0,35
-0,30
-0,25
-0,20
-0,15
-0,10
-0,05
0,00
0,05
1 2 3 4 5
Income group
Eu
ro
s 
pe
r t
rip
 
 26 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Number of observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
A = 1 if a private car is used. 0 if 
PT is used 
1030 0.29 0.45 
0
B AT T−  Time differential between PT 
and car (minutes) 
1030 3.79 20.38 
CBB Monetary cost of a PT trip 
(euros)a
1030 0.67 0.22 
0
AC  Monetary cost of a private car 
trip (euros)b
1030 3.77 2.53 
y Daily household income per 
capitac (euros) 
1030 104.38 58.86 
DC 0
B Ay C y C− − −  1030 0.18 0.17 
FEMALE = 1 if the individual is a 
woman. 0 otherwise 
1030 0.45 0.50 
FREE_PARK = 1 if the individual gets a car 
park for free at her place of 
work, 0 otherwise 
1030 0.41 0.49 
NB_CARS Number of cars in the 
household 
1030 1.41 0.60 
TWO_CARS =1 if the individual belongs to 
a household that owns two cars 
or more, 0 otherwise 
1030 0.35 0.48 
TWO_KIDS = 1 if the individual belongs to 
a household with two children 
or more, 0 otherwise 
1030 0.19 0.40 
RESIDENT = 1 if the individual lives in 
Paris, 0 otherwise 
1030 0.27 0.44 
CO2 CO2 emissions of the car usedd 
(g/Km) (specific to car users) 
296 187.92 11.23 
a In order to estimate CB, we use season ticket prices in force in July 2001. B
b In order to estimate CA, we use an average kilometric cost of €0.269 per kilometre. This average cost is 
computed by the Ile-de-France public transport regulator (STIF) for 2001 and includes fuel, maintenance and 
parking costs. 
c Ideally, it would have been better to use income available once the accommodation spending have been paid 
rather than income per capita, as an evident relationship exists between accommodation spending and transport 
spending. Unfortunately, this information is not available. 
d CO2 emissions are not recorded directly in the Global Transport Survey. Details on the methodology and on the 
additional data references used to estimate CO2 emissions are available on request. 
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Table 2: Results of the mode choice estimation: PA 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. p-value 
 .019396 .0024988 0.000 
DC -3.000992 .3684194 0.000 
FEMALE -.7882079 .1771549 0.000 
FREE_PARK 1.818979 .1723604 0.000 
TWO_CARS 1.029045 .1754081 0.000 
TWO_KIDS .54412 .2125591 0.010 
Constant -1.310106 .1962443 0.000 
1030 observations 
Log likelihood = -435.35 
McFadden pseudo R2 = 0.30 
0
B AT T−
 
 
Table 3: Values of time for different groups of travellers (euros per hour) 
 
 Income group  
All 1 2 3 4 5 
Car 7.9 €/h 5.0 €/h 6.7 €/h 7.9 €/h 10.0 €/h 11.4 €/h 
PT 8.2 €/h 6.0 €/h 7.2 €/h 8.0 €/h 9.9 €/h 11.4 €/h 
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Table 4: Description of the nine scenarios 
 
Scenario name Definition 
Redistribution 
of revenues to 
travellers 
% traffic 
charged 
Traffic 
reduction 
rate 
Toll level 
(per trip) 
Zone  
 
Traffic in or through 
Paris is charged with a 
uniform charge 
 
No 100 % 10% 
20% 
30% 
50% 
€0.70 
€1.70 
€2.55 
€4.25 
Inbound 
Cordon 
Traffic entering Paris 
is charged 
No 85 % 20% 
 
€2.20 
 Residents Zone + a 90% rebate 
for Paris residents 
No 100% 
(27% of 
residents) 
20% 
 
€2.55 
 
Green Zone + a 50% rebate 
for cars emitting less 
than 180g CO2 per km 
No 100% 
(31% of low 
CO2 emitting 
cars) 
20% 
 
€2.05 
PT funding Zone + net revenues 
used to cut PT fares 
Yes 100% 20% 
 
€1.40 
Uniform 
redistribution 
Zone + net revenues 
redistributed evenly to 
all commuters 
Yes 100% 20% 
 
€1.75 
 
Table 5: Average compensating variations (€/trip) and proportion of gainers under six 
toll scenarios inducing a 20% traffic reduction 
 
Scenario Motorists onlya All commutersb
 
 
Avg. cv % of trips 
with cv > 0 
Avg. cv 
 
% of trips 
with cv > 0 
Zone  €-1.01 0% €-0.35 0% 
Inbound 
Cordon €-1.03 20% €-0.36 11% 
Residents € -0.81 25% €-0.30 13% 
Green €-1.02 0% €-0.36 0% 
PT funding €-0.68 0% €-0.01 63% 
Uniform 
redistribution €-0.68 0% €-0.01 63% 
a “Motorists only” refer to those travelling by car before the toll has been introduced whatever their mode choice 
after tolling.  
b “All commuters” refer to all the members of our sample (i.e., motorists and non-captive PT users) plus captive 
PT users (i.e., those without a driver’s license or access to a car). A null cv is assigned to the latter. 
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Table 6: Average cv (€/trip) by income group under different levels of traffic reduction 
(Zone scenario) 
 
Traffic reduction Income groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 
cv in euros per trip      
      
10% (€0.70)      
Motorists only -0.48 -0.43 -0.42 -0.41 -0.40 
All commuters -0.11 -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 -0.22 
      
20% (€1.70)      
Motorists only -1.04 -1.03 -1.01 -1.00 -1.00 
All commuters -0.23 -0.29 -0.34 -0.43 -0.55 
      
30% (€2.55)      
Motorists only -1.48 -1.48 -1.47 -1.47 -1.49 
All commuters -0.31 -0.41 -0.49 -0.63 -0.82 
      
50% (€4.25)      
Motorists only -2.09 -2.25 -2.25 -2.30 -2.40 
All commuters -0.44 -0.60 -0.74 -0.97 -1.30 
      
cv in proportion to income (×1,000) 
      
10% (€0.70)      
Motorists only -0.64 -0.31 -0.24 -0.17 -0.10 
All commuters -0.14 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 
      
20% (€1.70)      
Motorists only -1.38 -0.74 -0.56 -0.40 -0.24 
All commuters -0.30 -0.21 -0.19 -0.17 -0.14 
      
30% (€2.55)      
Motorists only -1.92 -1.06 -0.82 -0.59 -0.36 
All commuters -0.41 -0.30 -0.27 -0.25 -0.20 
      
50% (€4.25)      
Motorists only -2.56 -1.61 -1.25 -0.92 -0.57 
All commuters -0.53 -0.43 -0.41 -0.39 -0.32 
NB: “Motorists only” refer to those travelling by car before the toll has been introduced whatever their mode 
choice after tolling. “All commuters” refer to all the members of our sample (i.e., motorists and non-captive PT 
users) plus captive PT users (i.e., those without a driver’s license or access to a car). A null cv is assigned to the 
latter. 
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Table 7: Average cv and average income per capita of two groups of motorists (Zone 
scenario, traffic reduction: 20%) 
 
 Avg. cv (€/trip) Avg. monthly income per capita (€) 
Motorists staying on the road after the 
introduction of the toll €-1.09 €2,733 
Motorists switching to PT €-0.71 €1,843 
 
 
 
Table 8: Difference between the average cv under Inbound Cordon, Residents and Green 
and the average cv under Zone (€/trip) in income group 1 and percentage of exempted 
motorists 
 % of exempted motorists 
 
Avg. cv under alternative scenarios 
minus avg. cv under Zone in income 
group 1 (€/trip) Income group 1 All 
Inbound Cordon    
Motorists only -0.15 7% 15% 
All commuters -0.05   
Residents    
Motorists only 0.00 16% 27% 
All commuters 0.00   
Green    
Motorists only 0.03 36% 31% 
All commuters 0.01   
NB: “Motorists only” refer to those travelling by car before the toll has been introduced whatever their mode 
choice after tolling. “All commuters” refer to all the members of our sample (i.e., motorists and non-captive PT 
users) plus captive PT users (i.e., those without a driver’s license or access to a car). A null cv is assigned to the 
latter. 
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Table 9: Average cv (€/trip) under PT Funding and Uniform Redistribution by income 
groups 
 
 PT Funding Uniform Redistribution 
Quintile Motorists onlya All commutersb Motorists onlya All commutersb
1 -0.71 0.12 -0.71 0.12 
2 -0.69 0.06 -0.69 0.06 
3 -0.68 0.00 -0.68 0.00 
4 -0.67 -0.09 -0.67 -0.09 
5 -0.67 -0.22 -0.67 -0.21 
All -0.68 -0.01 -0.68 -0.01 
a “Motorists only” refer to those travelling by car before the toll has been introduced whatever their mode choice 
after tolling.  
b “All commuters” refer to all the members of our sample (i.e., motorists and non-captive PT users) plus captive 
PT users (i.e., those without a driver’s license or access to a car). A null cv is assigned to the latter. 
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